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Abstract:    The  objective  of  the  present  article  is  to  present  the  theory  of  demand-led 
growth and some econometric evidence of the existence of a demand-led growth regime for 
the Brazilian economy. Initially, we will do a brief review of the theory of demand-led 
growth, based on Kaldor’s (1988) contribution for the theme. According to Kaldor, long-
run  growth  is  determined  by  the  sum  of  the  growth  rate  of  government  consumption 
spending and the growth rate of exports. Based on the methodology developed by Atesoglu 
(2002), we run some econometric tests for the hypothesis of a demand-led growth regime 
for the Brazilian economy. The results of the tests show that almost 95% of the growth rate 
of real GDP in the period 1990-2005 is explained by variables at the demand side of the 
economy.  The  econometric  tests  also  show  that  natural  growth  rate  of  the  Brazilian 
economy is endogenous, being determined by the growth rate of aggregate demand.  
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1 – Introduction.  
 
  In the last 25 years, the Brazilian economy is growing at an average rate of 2.6% per 
year, a rate considerably lower than the average growth rate in the period 1950-1980 and 
lower than the average  growth rate observed in other emergent economies like Russia, 
China and India.  Considering that the rate of growth of population is near by 1.5% per 
year, GDP per-capita growth rate is near by 1% per year. At this speed, it will take almost 
70  years  for  Brazilian  GDP  per-capita  to  reach  the  current  levels  of  GDP  per-capita 
observed in Spain or Portugal. So we can conclude that Brazilian economy is now in a 
situation of near-stagnation.  
  In the end of 1980 and beginning of 1990, this situation of near-stagnation was 
considered  to  be  the  result  of  the  persistent  high  inflation  observed  in  the  Brazilian 
economy. For instance, in March of 1990, in the last month of President Sarney term, the 
inflation  rate  was  72%  per  month,  defining  a  situation  of  hyper-inflation  (cf.  Bresser-
Pereira, 2004, p.282).  The end of hyper-inflation and the reduction of inflation levels to 
less than 10% per year were obtained after the successful implementation of Plano Real 
during President Fernando Henrique Cardoso first term.  This process, however, was the 
result  of  the  adoption  of  an  exchange-rate  anchor  for  inflation,  namely  a  crawling-peg 
exchange rate regime from 1995 to 1998. 
  Stabilization was not followed by a persistent acceleration of growth.  The growth 
acceleration observed in the first two years of Plano Real – when the average growth rate 
goes up to almost 5% per year – came to an end due to the effects of the external crisis in 
Mexico, East Asia and Russia.  
In the beginning of 1999, after a huge loss of international reserves caused by a 
sudden stop in capital flows to the Brazilian economy caused by a lack of confidence in the 
sustainability of the Brazilian exchange rate regime, Monetary authorities in Brazil adopted 
a flexible exchange rate regime.  
The new macroeconomic model was completed in 1999 with the adoption of an 
Inflation Targeting regime enhanced with a fiscal policy orientated for the generation of 
substantial primary surpluses in order to avoid the explosion of public debt as a ratio to 
GDP. 
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  The new macroeconomic model allowed a significant reduction of real interest rates 
– from a level of almost 25% per year in the period 1994-1998 to near 10% per year in the 
period 1999-2005 – and a devaluation of real exchange rate which was of fundamental 
importance for the elimination of current account deficits observed in the period 1994-
1998, that reach a level of almost 4% of GDP. Besides that, the fiscal policy oriented for 
the generation of significant primary surpluses allowed that public debt as a ratio to GDP to 
be reduced to a current level of near by 50%, after have reached a maximum value of 63% 
in 2002.     
  Despite the reduction in real interest rates, the reduction of external fragility and the 
stabilization of public debt; the growth performance of the Brazilian economy is still very 
weak. The average growth rate in the period 1999-2005 was only 2.3% per year compared 
to an average of 3.22% per year in the period 1994-1998.  
  These reasoning allowed us to take two important conclusions. First of all, a low 
inflation level is not a sufficient condition for a high growth performance. Second, the 
Brazilian experience shows us that the simple  adoption of  a consistent macroeconomic 
model – that is, a model for the governance of macroeconomic policy that produced a low 
and stable inflation rate, the stability of public debt as a ratio to GDP and the reduction of 
external fragility – is neither a sufficient condition for growth acceleration in a persistent 
way. In this setting, the relevant question to be asked is: what should be done in order to 
produce a persistent increase in the growth rate if the Brazilian economy?  
  There are two answers for this question. The first one, based in neoclassical growth 
models and in the methodology of growth accounting, defines that the reason for the low 
growth performance of the Brazilian economy in the last 25 years must be found in the 
supply side of the economy. More specifically, the sources of the low growth rate of GDP 
were a low level of domestic savings – due to the negative contribution of the public sector 
and the weak incentives for private savings – and a low technological dynamism expressed 
in a very low growth rate of total factor productivity. According to this view, a persistent 
increase in the growth rate would demand a reform in the social security system in order to 
increase the government saving and an increase in the degree of openness of the Brazilian 
economy in order to stimulate the increase in the productivity of the Brazilian firms.  
   3 
  The  second  answer  for  the  question  at  hand  was  based  on  the  idea  that  the 
macroeconomic  model  adopted  in  Brazil  on  the  last  decade  caused  a  contraction  of 
aggregate  demand  and  hampers  the  growth  rate  of  real  GDP.  This  occurs  because  the 
combination of still high real interest rates with the generation of significant (and, in the 
last  years,  increasing)  primary  surpluses  has  the  effect  of  depress  aggregate  demand. 
According to this view, the solution for the near-stagnation of the Brazilian economy would 
be  the  end  of  the  current  macroeconomic  model  based  on  inflation  targeting-flexible 
exchange rates and generation of primary surpluses.   
  In our opinion, both views about the problem at hand are wrong. In the present 
article, we adopted a Keynesian point of view according to which the determinants of long-
run growth must be found in the demand side, not in the supply side of the economy. 
However,  we  rejected  the  naïve  Keynesian  view  according  to  which  growth  must  me 
stimulated by whatever policy that increases aggregate demand. The Fiscal Crisis of Brazil 
sets clear and tight limits for growth policies based on increase in government consumption 
expenditures. According to our view a persistent increase in the growth rate of the Brazilian 
economy demands the adoption of a new growth model, in which exports are the dynamic 
element of  aggregate  demand  and,  for  this  reason,  the  engine of  long-run  growth.  The 
adoption of this growth model, however, requires an special care with the level of real 
exchange rate.  
  The present article is organized in five sections, including the present introduction. 
In section 2, we will preset a brief review of the  growth performance  of the Brazilian 
economy in the last two decades. In section 3 we will present the theory of demand-led 
growth according to which the long-run growth rate of real GDP is a weighted average of 
growth rates of government consumption expenditures and exports. In section 4, based on 
the methodology developed by Atesoglu (2002), we will do some econometric tests for the 
hypothesis of a demand-led growth regime for the Brazilian economy. The results of the 
tests showed that almost 95% of GDP growth in the period 1990-2005 is explained by 
demand-side variables. Besides that, based on the methodology developed by Ledesma and 
Thirwall  (2002),  we  showed  that  the  natural  growth  rate  of  the  Brazilian  economy  is 
endogenous, increasing considerably in boom times.  Taken for granted these results, there   4 
are no restrictions from the supply side of the economy to a permanent increase in the 
growth rate of the Brazilian economy. Section 5 summarizes the conclusions of the article.   
 
2 – The Growth Performance of the Brazilian Economy in the Last Decades.  
 
  In the two last decades, the Brazilian economy had experienced a strong slowdown 
in the growth rate of real GDP. In fact, as we can see in Figure 2.1, the average growth rate 
of the Brazilian economy was superior to 7% per year in the period 1950-1980. In the 
1980’s, however, the average growth rate slowdown. In the period 1981-1990, the so-called 
“lost decade”, the average growth rate of the Brazilian economy was inferior to 2% per 
year. Between 1991 and 2000, the average growth rate increases a little further to 2.7% per 
year, staying behind the average of the period 1950-1980. Finally, in the period between 
1991 and 2000, the average growth rate of real GDP slowdown again to 2.2% per year.    
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Source: IPEADATA.   
   
The  fundamental  question  to  be  asked  is:  what  factors  explained  the  strong 
slowdown in growth rates of the Brazilian economy after 1980? During the 1980’s the 
slowdown in economic growth was believed to be the result of the cumulative effects of the 
external  debt  crisis  and  the  near  hyper-inflation  observed  in  Brazil  during  the  decade. 
During the 1990’s, the external debt problem was solved by means of the Brady Plan and   5 
inflation was finally defeated by Plano Real.  But the growth performance of the Brazilian 
economy did not come back to the same level of the period 1950-1980.  
  The conventional explanation for growth slowdown of the Brazilian economy is 
based in the growth accounting exercises. According to this methodology, the growth rate 
of the Brazilian economy slowdown due to a substantial reduction of the growth rate of the 
supply of factors of production (basically, capital) and to a reduction of the growth rate of 
total factor productivity after the second oil shock (cf. Barbosa, 2006). This reduction in the 
growth  rate  of  total  factor  productivity  is  considered  to  be  the  result  of  a  lot  of 
inefficiencies that came from the import substitution model adopted in Brazil until the end 
of  the  1970’s  (cf.  Franco,  1999).  Also  according  to  this  methodology,  the  Brazilian 
economy should, in current conditions, grow at a rate no superior than 3.5% per year, if the 
commitment with price stability is to be kept alive.  
  An alternative explanation for the slowdown in growth rates is based in demand 
conditions,  instead  of  supply  conditions.  According  to  this  line  of  reasoning,  long-run 
growth is demand-led, instead of supply driven; so it is of fundamental importance the 
analysis  of  the  factors  that  driven  the  growth  of  aggregate  demand.  According  to  this 
framework, the growth model of the Brazilian economy was based in the expansion of 
consumption  expenditures  in  luxury  goods,  being  this  expansion  induced  by  an  active 
policy of income concentration in upper classes (cf. Bresser-Pereira, 2003, p.181).  
  This  growth  model  came  to  an  end  in  the  1980’s  due  to  the  transition  to  a 
democratic  government  in  Brazil.  In  effect,  democracy  put  income  distribution  and 
reduction of inequality as the most important political issues for the Brazilian society. In 
this way, there will be no longer possible to driven aggregate demand growth by means of 
increases in consumption expenditures in luxury goods permitted by continuous increases 
in income concentration.  
  According to this view, the growth problem of the Brazilian economy is that, since 
the beginning of the 1980’s, there is no alternative source of aggregate demand expansion 
that could allow a high growth rate of real GDP.   
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3 – The Theory of Demand-Led Growth: the Keynesian view.  
3.1 Long-run endogenity of the supply of factors of production.  
Neoclassical growth models take for granted that the fundamental limit to long-run 
growth  is  the  supply  of  factors  of  production.  Aggregate  demand  is  relevant  only  to 
determine the degree of capacity utilization, but have no direct influence over the rate of 
expansion of productive capacity. In the long-run, Say’s law is supposed to hold; i.e, supply 
creates its own demand.   
But it will be true that supply of factors of production is independent of demand? 
This question is originally raised by Kaldor (1988), originating the theory of demand-led 
growth. The starting point of demand-led growth theory is that means of production used in 
a  modern  capitalist  economy  are  themselves  goods  produced  within  the  system.  The 
“supply” of means of productions should never be taken as given and independent from the 
demand for them. In this theoretical framework, the fundamental economic problem is not 
the  allocation  of  a  given  amount  of  resources  between  alternative  uses;  but  the 
determination of the rate of creation of these resources. In the words of Setterfield:   
“The use of produced means of production implies that the ´scarcity of resources´ in 
processing activities cannot be thought of as being independent of the level of activity 
in  the economy.  What  is  chiefly  important  in  processing  activities is the  dynamic 
propensity of the economy to create resources (that is, to deepen and/or widen its 
stock of capital) rather than the static problem of resource allocation” (1997, p.50).  
In order to understand the long-run endogenity of factors of production, we will start 
with the supply of capital. The quantity of capital that exists in a point of time – or, in other 
words, the productive capacity that exists in the economy – is the result of past investment 
decisions. From this line of argument, we can conclude that the stock of capital is not a 
given quantity determined by “nature”, but is dependent of the rate at which entrepreneurs 
want to increase the stock of capital.  
So  the  fundamental  determinant  of  the  “capital  stock”  is  investment  decision. 
Investment, in turn, is determined by two set of variables: i) the opportunity cost of capital 
(mainly determined by the level of short-term interest rate set by the Central Bank); ii)  the 
expectations  about  the  future  growth  of  sales  and  production.    In  this  setting,  if 
entrepreneurs expect a strong and sustainable increase in demand for the goods that they   7 
produce – as it would be expected in an economy that shows a persistent high growth rate – 
then they will make large investment expenditures.    
In other words, investment is an endogenous variable that came in line with the 
expected  growth  of  aggregate  demand,  since  one  fundamental  restriction  is  met:  the 
expected rate of return of capital has to be bigger than the cost of capital. If this condition is 
met, the “supply of capital” should not be considered a limit to long-run growth.  
It is true that in the short and in the middle run, production should not increase 
beyond the maximum productive capacity of the economy. In the long-run, however, the 
productive capacity must be increased – by means of investment expenditures – in order to 
met the increase in aggregate demand. In the words of Kaldor:  
“Since  under  the  stimulus  of  growing  demand  capacity  of  all  sectors  will  be 
expanded through additional investment, there are no long-run limits to growth on 
account of supply constraints; such constraints, whether due to capacity shortage or 
to local labor shortage, are essentially short-run phenomena – at any one time, they 
are a heritage of the past” (1988, p.157).    
A  very  common  objection  to  this  reasoning  is  the  idea  that  investment  needs 
“previous” saving in order to be realized; that is, any increase in investment expenditure 
requires a previous increase in the saving rate of the economy.  According to this line of 
reasoning, the “supply of capital” is limited by the share of real income that society does 
not  want  to  consume.  Saving  defined  this  way  is  determined  by  private  sector  saving, 
government saving and foreign saving.  
It is not true that investment requires “previous” saving in order to be realized. In 
fact, investment expenditures require only the creation of liquidity by commercial banks. If 
commercial banks are ready to increase their credit operations in favorable terms, then it 
will  be  possible  for  firms  to  start  their  investment  projects,  buying  new  machines  and 
equipment from the capital goods producers. Once the investment expenditure is done, it 
will  be  generated  an  extra  income  of  such  magnitude  that,  at  the  end  of  the  process, 
aggregate saving will adjust to the new value of aggregate investment. The extra saving 
generated in this way should now be used for funding short-term debts with commercial 
banks in long-term debts in capital markets. More specifically, firms could sell shares or 
long-term bonds in capital markets in order to raise the required funds to pay all their debs   8 
to commercial banks. These operations will not necessarily decrease the price of bonds or 
shares since families will be looking for new assets to store their extra saving.  
There are, however, financial limits to the increase in the productive capacity. In 
fact, firms must be ready to adjust their productive capacity to the expected growth of 
demand for their products if and only if the expected rate of return of the new investment 
projects is higher than the opportunity  cost of  capital.  In a first  approximation we can 
define the cost of capital as the average interest rate that firms must pay for the required 
funding  for  their  investment  projects.  There  are  three  sources  of  funds  to  finance  the 
investment project of firms: retained earnings, debts and equity. So, the cost of capital is the 
weighted average of the cost of each of these sources of finance. If the cost of capital is too 
high – for instance, due a very tight monetary policy that increase the short-term interest 
rate, increasing the cost of borrowing – than new investment projects may not be profitable, 
and investment expenditure will not adjust to the level required by the expected growth of 
aggregate demand.   
  We will now turn our attention to the “supply of labor”. According to our view, the 
“supply of labor” should not be considered a limit to the growth of production in the long-
run.  
First of all, the number of work hours could be increased easily in order to increase 
the level of production.
1.  
Second, the participation rate – defined as the ratio between the labor force and total 
population in work age – could increase in response to a strong increase in demand for 
labor (cf. Thirlwall, 2002, p.86). In fact, during boom times, the opportunity cost of leisure 
increases, stimulating a strong increase in the participation rate.  So we can conclude that 
the growth rate of labor force could accelerate during boom times due to the fact that some 
people may decide to enter in the labor force as a response to the incentives created by a 
booming labor market.  
                                                 
1 In the case of Brazil, industrial production could increase near by 44% - according to IEDI estimates  (Valor 
Econômico, 24/03/2006) – compared to the current level of production by means of increasing the number of 
work hours. If we consider the adoption of additional work turns, production could increase almost 57% 
compared to the current level of production.    9 
Finally, we have to state that population and labor force are not a datum from the 
view point of the economy as a whole. A shortage of labor – even of qualified workers – 
can se solved by immigration from other countries. For example, countries as Germany and 
France could sustain high growth rates during the 1950’s and 1960’ due to immigration of 
workers from the countries of the periphery of Europe (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey and 
south of Italy).   
A last element to be considered is technological progress. Is it possible to consider 
the  rate  of  technological  progress  a  restriction  to  long-run  growth?  If  the  rate  of 
technological progress is exogenous to the economic system then growth will be limited by 
the pace at which technological knowledge is increased. However, technological progress is 
not exogenous to the economic system.  
First of all, the pace at which firms introduce innovations is largely determined by 
the  rate  of  capital  accumulation;  since  a  large  part  of  technological  innovations  are 
embodied in new machines and equipment.
2 
Second, even that small part of technical progress that is disembodied is determined 
by  dynamic  economies  of  scale  such  as  learning-by-doing.  So  we  can  establish  the 
existence of a structural relationship between the growth rate of labor productivity and the 
growth rate of output known as “Kaldor-Verdoon law”
34. In this setting, an increase in 
aggregate demand will cause an increase in the growth rate of labor productivity since the 
growth rate of output will be increased as a consequence of a greater demand growth.  
                                                 
2 This idea was originally presented in Kaldor (1957) by means of the “Technical Progress Function”, which 
establishes the existence of a structural relationship between the growth rate of output per-worker and the 
growth  rate  of  capital  per-worker.  According  to  Kaldor  is  not  possible  to  isolate  the  growth  of  labor 
productivity due to introduction of new technologies from the growth of labor productivity due to an increase 
in capital per-worker. That is so because almost all technological innovations that increase labor productivity 
require the use of a biggest level of capital per-worker, since these innovations are embodied in new machines 
and equipment.  
3 Some econometric evidence about the validity of “Kaldor-Verdoon’s Law” for United States can be found in 
McCombie and De rider (1984).  
4  Ledesma  (2002)  estimates  a  demand-led  growth  model  for  17  OECD  countries  (Germany,  Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denamark, United States, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Holland, Japan, Norway , 
Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdon) in the period 1965-1994.  Based on his econometric evidences, we 
can establish the existence of a structural relationship between the growth rate of labor productivity and a set 
of other variables, in particular the growth rate of output. The estimated structural equation is:  
GAP K O I y r 021 . 0 617 . 0 ) / ( 0002 . 0 642 . 0 015 . 0 + + + + − = ,  
Where:  r is the growth rate of labor productivity, y is the growth rate of real output, (I/O) is investment as a 
share of real GDP, K is a index of technological innovation and  GAP is an estimate of the technological gap.     10 
Based on his reasoning we can say that there is no such a thing as potential or full-
employment output for the long-run, since the supply of factors of production and the rate 
of technological progress is demand determined. “Full-employment” is essentially a short-
run concept that ignores that endogenity of “natural growth rate” in the long-run. In the 
words of Kaldor:   
“Full employment of an industrial region or a country is therefore essentially a 
short-run concept, which ignores the long-run mobility of labor and the possibility 
of an increase in training which responds to demand in much the same way as 
capital investment” (1988, p.157).   
 
3.2 Determinants of long-run growth.   
If  supply  of  factors  of  production  should  not  be  considered  a  limit  to  long-run 
growth, what are the determinants of economic growth in the long-run? According to the 
Keynesian view, the ultimate determinant of economic growth is aggregate demand. Firms 
will increase their production levels as a response to an increase in aggregate demand two 
conditions are satisfied: i) profit margins are high enough to give to entrepreneurs the rate 
of profit desired by then; ii) realized profit rate must be bigger than the cost of capital. If 
these two conditions are met, then the rate of growth of real output will be determined by 
the rate of growth of autonomous demand; i.e. the growth of that part off aggregate demand 
that is independent of the level and/or variations of the level of output and income.  
For open economies there are two components of autonomous demand: exports and 
government consumption expenditures (cf. Park, 2000). Investment expenditures are not a 
component of autonomous demand since investment decision in capital assets is basically 
determined by entrepreneurs’ expectations about future growth of production and sales, 
according to the so-called principle of acceleration of investment theory (cf. Harrod, 1939). 
In other words, investment is not an exogenous variable from the view point of growth 
process; since it is driven by output growth.  So, long-run growth rate of real output is a 
weighted average of the rate of exports growth and the rate of government consumption 
expenditures.  
For a small open economy that do not have a convertible currency, exports growth 
is  the  exogenous  variable  in  growth  process.  If  the  rate  of  growth  of  government   11 
consumption expenditures is bigger than the rate of exports growth than real output and 
income will increase faster than exports. Supposing an income-elasticity of imports bigger 
than one (as it is usual in open economies) than the rate of imports growth will be bigger 
than the rate of exports growth, generating a growing trade deficit (assuming constant terms 
of trade), which will be unsustainable in the long-run
5.   
The  growth rate of exports is equal to the product between income-elasticity of 
exports (ε) and the growth rate of world income (z).  So we can establish that the long-run 
growth rate of real output (g
*) according to the theory of demand-led growth is given by:   
z g ε =
*  (3.1) 
4 – Demand-Led Growth in Brazil? Some econometric evidence.  
In  this  section  we  are  going  to  estimate  some  regression  equations  to  test  the 
hypothesis that Brazilian economic growth is demand determined. First of all, we are going 
to analyze the role of a few demand side variables on the Brazilian economy performance 
in the 1990-2005 period of time. 
Particularly, we are going to provide some evidence that exports and government 
consumption are exogenous variables in the long-run growth process, thus corroborating to 
the theory of demand led growth presented in section 3. Afterward, we are going to provide 
a few evidences supporting the view that the Brazilian natural rate of economic growth is 
endogenous. If it is true, the Brazilian economic performance is not bounded by supply side 
aspects.  Our  estimates  for  the  1980-2002  period  show  some  evidence  that  the  annual 
natural rate of economic growth can vary from 5,2% to 8% in good times. Therefore, there 
is no reason to believe that the Brazilian economy is fated to grow at an annual rate of 3.5% 
because of supply side restrictions, as it is said by Brazilian neoclassical economists.  
 
                                                 
5 It is important to notice that a growth rate of exports bigger than the growth rate of government consumption 
expenditures is not a sufficient condition for a sustainable growth process in the long-run. In fact, it is also 
necessary to be a balance of payments equilibrium. For open economies with zero-capital mobility this means 
that long-run growth rate will be equal to the ratio between the income elasticity of exports and the income 
elasticity  of  imports, being  this  ratio  multiplied by  the  growth  rate  of  world income,  what is  known  as 
“Thirwall’s Law” (cf. Thirwall, 1997). The introduction of capital flows does not alter significantly the long-
run equilibrium growth rate (cf. McCombie and Roberts, 2002, pp.95-96). In the present article, however, we 
are not interested in balance of payments restrictions of growth of Brazilian economy, but to shown the 
existence of a demand-led growth regime in Brazil. For this reason, we will not use “Thirwall’s Law” in our 
econometric tests.    12 
4.1 Testing the demand-led growth hypothesis.  
 
Following Atesoglu (2002), in the present section we are going to assess the impact 
of real exports (X), real investments (I), real government consumption (G), and real money 
supply (M3) on real GDP (Y) for the Brazilian economy. 
The data source for real GDP, real government consumption, real exports, and real 
investments  is  the  System  of  National  Accounts  provided  by  the  Brazilian  Statistical 
Bureau (IBGE/SCN). The real money supply is from the Brazilian Central Bank and it is 
divided by the General Price Index (IGP-DI) from Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV). All 
variables were transformed in a way that their values in 1990 are equal to 100 (1990 = 
100), and they are stated in natural logarithms; as a result the estimated coefficients give the 
elasticity between the left and right hand side variable. The time period under study is from 
the first quarter of 1991 to the fourth quarter of 2005, so the data is quarterly (N = 60). The 
statistical  packages  used  to estimate the  regressions,  to  perform  statistical  tests,  and  to 
generate graphics are Stata 8.1 and EViews 4.0. 
All variables have an upward trend through time and a stochastic trend
6. Therefore, 
it is likely that these variables have a spurious correlation. If this is true, Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regressions will probably lead to erroneous  conclusions. Moreover, OLS 
estimates are not consistent and statistical inference tests are not appropriate. 
To check this out, we have performed Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests. To set 
the number of lags in the ADF tests, we started with a relatively large number of them (8 
lags) and checked if the last one was statistically significant different from zero. If it was 
not significant, we would proceed and perform the test with 7 lags. This procedure was 
carried out to the point in which the last lag was found to be significant. Then, we used 
Schwarz and Akaike Information Criterion to decide if an intercept and trend should be 
included in the test, and we have tested their level of significance. 
The results are reported in Table 4.1 and the ADF tests point out that all variables 
are integrated of order one, thus they are not stationary: 
 
 
                                                 
6 The series graphs are available by request.   13 
Table 4.1 – Series Stationary Tests 
Variable  Specification  Levels  Differences 
5 Lags – Constant + Trend  -2.306    Y 
4 Lags – Constant     -5.119** 
2 Lags – Constant  0.428    X 
2 Lags – Constant    -15.680** 
2 Lags  0.951    I 
2 Lags    -9.252** 
6 Lags  4.063    G 
5 Lags – Constant    -6.952** 
No Lags – Constant + Trend  -1.891    M3 
No Lags – Constant    -7.933** 
Notes: Rejection of the unit root hypothesis is indicated with one asterisk (5%) and two asterisk (1%). 
 
Therefore, by the ADF tests results, we can not run OLS regressions to appraise the 
relation among the macroeconomic variables listed above. One way to deal with spurious 
regression problems due to nonstationary time series is to take the variables first differences 
and check if they are stationary. Because all series are integrated of order one I(1) via ADF 
tests,  that  is,  their  first  differences  are  stationary  (see  Table  4.1),  we  can  run  OLS 
regression using the variables first difference. The results are illustrated below:  
 
Regression equation 1 – OLS estimates employing the variables first difference 
∆Y =  0.0009  + 0.1542∆X  + 0.2527∆I  + 0.3730∆G  – 0.0233∆M3   
  (0.00285)  (0.02520)  (0.05348)  (0.06431)  (0.04741)  standard deviation 
  (0.31)  (6.12)  (4.72)  (5.80)  (-0.49)  t – test 
             
  Adj R-squared = 0.7987         
  N = 59    F(4, 54) = 58.53     
 
All variables on the right hand side of regression equation (1) have the expected 
signs and they are significant at 5% or 1% significance level, except M3. Tests to check for 
problems of heteroscedasticity (Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg), autocorrelation (Durbin-
Watson), multicollinearity (Variance Inflation Factor), and nonnormality of residuals (Stata 
test based on D’Agostine, Belanger and D’Agostine Jr., 1990 cited by Park, 2003) did not 
show any of the above cited problems
7. Consequently, the inference statistics are reliable. 
The right hand side variables explain 80% of income variation, a considerable amount. 
Government consumption has the major impact on income, a 1% increase in the former 
raises the later by 0.37%. 
                                                 
7 The results are available by request with the authors.   14 
The main problem in the first difference variables OLS regression is that valuable 
long-run information can be lost if the variables are cointegrated. The condition for this is 
that the error term of the estimated regression must be stationary. 
The results of Johansen Cointegration test to verify the cointegration among the 
above  cited  variables  support  this  conclusion  (that  the  estimated  error  term  series  is 
stationary). The same procedures of the ADF tests were followed to establish the number of 
lags that should be included and to decide the inclusion of a constant and a trend in the 
Johansen Cointegration Test (Table 4.2). This procedure to stipulate the model to be tested 
was also used to specify the Error Correction Model (Table 4.3). The variables have at least 
two cointegration vectors as we can see in Table 4.2: 
 
Table 4.2 – Johansen Cointegration Test 
  Likelihood  5 Percent  1 Percent  Hypothesized 
Eigenvalue  Ratio  Critical Value  Critical Value  No. of CE(s) 
 0.554093   120.0439   87.31   96.58        None ** 
 0.474361   74.81585   62.99   70.05     At most 1 ** 
 0.309218   38.80000   42.44   48.45     At most 2 
 0.194227   18.08383   25.32   30.45     At most 3 
 0.101450   5.990469   12.25   16.26     At most 4 
Notes: Lag interval of ∆Y, ∆X, ∆I, ∆G, ∆M3 included to perform the test = 1 to 3. It is also included an 
intercept and a deterministic trend in the test. 
 
The  evidences  suggest  that  OLS  residuals  are  stationary,  so there  is  a  long run 
relationship among the variables. Accordingly, by the ADF tests results we conclude that 
the variables are I(1), but they are cointegrated. This result points out that OLS regression 
making  use  of  level  variables  provides  better  estimates  since  it  captures  the  above 
mentioned long run relationship. In such regression, the residuals statistical tests provide 
evidences of autocorrelation
8. To correct this problem, we have performed the Cochrane-
Orcutt AR1 regression. The results are presented below:  
 
Regression Equation 2 – Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression (iterated estimates) 
Y =  0.8971  + 0.1539X  + 0.2719I  + 0.3690G  + 0.0135M3   
  (0.23039)  (0.01681)  (0.03678)  (0.06391)  (0.01628)  standard deviation 
  (3.89)  (9.16)  (7.39)  (5.77)  (0.83)  T – test 
         
  Adj R-squared = 0.9524                DW Original = 1.296 
  N = 59    F(4, 54) =  291.23  DW Transformed = 1.761 
 
                                                 
8 The results are available by request with the authors.   15 
The conclusions are nearly the same as in the prior regression. The coefficients have 
the same signs and their magnitude have slightly changed, with the exception of real money 
supply.  Nevertheless,  its  coefficient  remains  not  significantly  different  from  zero.  The 
similar results in both regressions are additional evidence that OLS regression results using 
level variables are robust. As expected, adjusted R square and t-statistics have increased. 
To check for variables endogeneity, we have employed the vector error correction 
model  estimated  by  Johansen  method.  The  results  are  reported  in  Table  4.3. The  error 
correction term indicates which variable adjusts to the long run equilibrium between the 
dependent (real GDP) and the explanatory variables.    
 
Table 4.3 – Results from estimation of vector error correction model 
           
  ∆Y  ∆X  ∆I  ∆G  ∆M3 
Error correction term  1.1001  -0.9457  3.6575  -0.3047  -1.4779 
(t-statistic)  (3.93178)  (-0.8077)  (5.5471)  (-0.8834)  (-1.3251) 
(standard deviation)  (0.27980)  (1.1709)  (0.6594)  (0.3449)  (1.1153) 
Adj. R-squared  0.871  0.702  0.609  0.833  -0.092 
S.E. (equation)  0.0139  0.0583  0.0328  0.0172  0.0555 
Notes: Lag interval of ∆Y, ∆X, ∆I, ∆G, ∆M3 included in error correction model = 1 to 3. In the vector error 
correction model it is also included an intercept and a deterministic trend.  
 
The  results  of  Table  4.3  indicate  that  Y  and  I  adjust  to  deviations  in  long  run 
equilibrium. Therefore, there are evidences of a bidirectional causality between GDP and 
investments,  and  unidirectional  causality  running  from  exports  and  government 
consumption  to  GDP  and  investments.  Money  supply  does  not  adjust  to  long  run 
equilibrium, but since it were not found to be significant, it is not possible to say that this 
variable have an influence on GDP and investment. 
However, it must be stressed that, on the basis of the regression equation estimated 
coefficients, for a 1% increase on government real consumption, the increase of real GDP is 
about 0.36%. Assuming that the government revenue at Central, States and City level is 
approximately 40% of GDP, a government current consumption increase of 1% would raise 
government revenue by 0.15%, thus amplifying the public deficit. 
Taking into consideration that tax burden in the Brazilian economy (about 40%) is 
close to its limit and that there is a large public debt as a ratio of GDP (about 51% in liquid 
terms), it is evident the impossibility to pull the growth of Brazilian economy by means of   16 
increasing government consumption expenditure, The only autonomous source of demand 
capable to induce acceleration of Brazilian economic growth is the demand for exports. In 
other words, the Brazilian economy growth model must be an export-led growth type.  
The  money  supply  does  not  adjust  to  long  run  disequilibria,  but  because  its 
coefficient is not statistically significant, it is not possible to state that this variable has 
some  influence  on  Y  and  I.  As  a  result,  it  seems  unlikely  that  monetary  policy  has  a 
persistent effect on the Brazilian economic growth. That is, the pace of real money supply 
growth does not seem to have a statistically significant influence over the performance of 
real GDP and/or real investment.  
Apart from money supply, this section’s findings are very similar to the Atesoglu 
(2002)  ones.  The  causal  relations  support  the  Keynesian  approach  that  exports  and 
government  spending  can  be  an  important  source  to  stimulate  demand  and  economic 
growth. Though, it must be stressed that, in face of the Brazilian fiscal crisis, it does not 
seem  to  be  possible  to  pull  the  country’s  economic  growth  through  the  expansion  of 
government consumption expenditures.  
4.2 Is the Brazilian natural rate of economic growth endogenous?  
In this sub-section we are going to test endogeneity of the natural rate of growth in 
the  Brazilian  economy.  This  section  is  based  on  a  study  carried  out  by  Ledesma  and 
Thirlwall  (2002).  By  means  of Okun’s  concept  (1962 cited  for  Ledesma  and  Thirlwall 
2002), the natural rate of growth (gn) is the one that keeps constant the unemployment rate. 
Okun (1962 cited by Ledesma and Thirlwall 2002) makes use of the following specification 
for the percentage variation of the unemployment level: 
 
(4.1)  ( ) g b a U − = ∆%  
 
Where U stands for unemployment level, g is the rate of GDP growth, and a and b 
are both constants. By equation (4.1), when ∆%U = 0, the natural rate of growth is defined 
by a/b. 
Because some people give up looking for work when the rate of economic growth is 
low,  it  is  possible  that a  coefficient  is  underestimated.  In  this  case, the  natural  rate  of 
economic  growth would also be underestimated. On the other hand, in periods of high   17 
economic  growth,  some  part  of  the  additional  labor  force  that  is  necessary  to  raise 
production comes from idle labor force and from extra working hours. Thus, b coefficient 
turns to be underestimated, what leads to an overestimation of the natural rate of economic 
growth.  Thus,  the  natural  rate  of  economic  growth  can  be  under  or  overestimated 
depending on which of the two effects prevail. 
Another approach to estimate the natural rate of economic growth in the attempt to 
avoid such problems was developed by Thirlwall (1969):  
 
(4.2)  ( ) U b a g % 1 1 ∆ − =  
 
In  equation  (4.2),  when  the  unemployment  rate  variation  is  zero,  we  have  the 
following equation: 
 
(4.3)  1 a g =  
 
Thus,  the natural  rate  of economic  growth  is  defined  by  the  estimated  value  of 
regression equation intercept. The problem of using equation (4.2) is that the natural rate of 
economic growth is endogenous, so the estimated coefficients will be biased. 
Once the natural rate of economic growth is estimated, we can create a dummy 
variable that assumes the value 1 (one) when the economy rate of economic growth is 
superior to the natural one estimated by equations (4.1) or (4.2), and 0 (zero) when the 
opposite happens. With the introduction of this dummy variable, we have the following 
regression equation specification: 
 
(4.4)  ( ) U c D b a g % 2 2 2 ∆ + + =  
 
Where: D represents the dummy variable. In the specification of equation (4.4), two 
potentially  different  natural  rates  of  economic  growth  are  estimated.  The  first  one  is 
estimated for the periods in which the rate of economic growth is higher than the natural 
rate  of  economic  growth  given  by  equation  (4.2).  In  this  in  case,  the  natural  rate  of 
economic growth is given by a2 + b2. The second one is estimated taking into consideration   18 
the periods where the  rate of economic growth is lower than the natural one  given by 
equation (4.2). In this case, the natural rate is represented by a2. 
Because it is a natural rate, it would not be expected to change with variations in the 
rate  of  economic  growth.  If  this  statement  is  accurate,  the  dummy  variable  coefficient 
should not be significant. On the contrary, the natural rate of  economic  growth (gn) is 
endogenous and it responds to changes in the rate of economic growth (g). 
The database used to carry out the empirical analysis is unemployment level from 
the  Brazilian  Statistical  Bureau  (Instituto  Brasileiro de  Geografia  e Estatística  -  IBGE) 
Unemployment Monthly Research (Pesquisa Mensal do Emprego - PME). This series is 
monthly available, but they were transformed into quarterly data by taking an arithmetic 
mean of the three months of each trimester. The GDP Chained Index series is from IBGE 
National Accounts System (IBGE/SCN). The empirical analysis covers the period from the 
first trimester of 1980 to the fourth trimester of 2002. Both variables were transformed into 
rates  of  growth,  so  the  first  observation  of  each  series  was  lost.  Thus,  the  sample  is 
composed by 91 observations. 
In view of the quarterly data series, the estimated natural rate of economic growth 
(NREG) via equations (4.1) and (4.2) are given in Table 4.4: 
 
TABELA  4.4  –  ESTIMATED  NATURAL  RATE  OF  ECONOMIC  GROWTH  VIA  OKUN  AND 
THIRLWALL EQUATIONS  
  Estimation 
Method 
Intercept  Slope  DW  Ad. R
2.  NREG 
Equation (1)  RR  1,61  -2,70***  2,32  0,11  0,60 
    (0,99)  (3,49)       
Equation (2)  OLS  0,59***  -0,053***  1,89  0,15  0,59 
    (2,99)  (4,12)       
Notes: *** it is significant at the 1% level; ** it is significant at the 5% level; * it is significant at the 10% 
level. OLS stands for Method of Ordinary Least Squares; RR is the Robust Regression Method to correct 
problems of residuals non-normality heteroskedasticity. DW is the Durbin-Watson test value for first order 
autocorrelation process; Ad. R
2 is the Adjusted R
2; and NREG means Natural Rate of Economic Growth. 
 
The rate of economic growth estimated from both equations are quite similar, giving 
support to these results, despite the potential problems previously mentioned. 
With the estimated natural rate of economic growth around 0.60% per trimester, the 
annualized natural rate is close to 2.50%. Thus, according to the Table 4.4 results it is 
possible to state that between 1980 and 2002 the rate of economic growth that maintains 
unemployment rate constant in the Brazilian economy is near to 2.50%.   19 
In Table 4.5 is shown the estimation results of the regression equation (4.4). In the 
third column, MA means that the rate of economic growth is a Moving Average Variable 
composed by three trimesters.  
 
TABLE  4.5  –  ESTIMATED  NATURAL  RATE  OF  ECONOMIC  GROWTH  VIA  OKUN  AND 
THIRLWALL EQUATIONS INCLUDING A DUMMY VARIABLE  
  Estimation 
Method 
Intercept  Dummy 
Coefficien
t 







Equation (4)  MQO  -0,84***  2,85***  0,03***  2,28  0,61  -0,84  2,01 
    (-4,40)  (10,40)  (-3,35 )         
Equation (4) MA  PWER  -0,26*  1,56***  0,011**  1,82  0,54  -0,26  1,3 
    (-1,66)  (10,26)  (-2,14)         
Notes: *** it is significant at the 1% level; ** it is significant at the 5% level; * it is significant at the 10% 
level. OLS stands for Method of Ordinary Least Squares; PWER is the Prais-Wisten Method with robust 
standard errors to correct for problems of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. DW is the Durbin-Watson 
test value for first order autocorrelation process; Ad. R
2 is the Adjusted R
2; NREG means Natural Rate of 
Economic Growth; and MA is the regression equation using a three month Moving Average data. 
 
The results of regression equation (4.4) indicate that the natural rate of economic 
growth responds to effective rate of growth. To be precise, the natural rate of growth is 
endogenous. The results of Table 4.5 (second line) indicate that in the periods of high 
economic growth, the annual natural rate is around 8%, while in periods of weak economic 
growth or recession, the annual natural rate is negative, about to -3,5%.  
It is good to remember that the data period is quarterly, so there it has a great deal of 
variation.  Therefore,  employing  moving  average  data  reduces  the  oscillation  from  one 
trimester to another. The changes on the estimation results of regression equation (4.4) are 
clear  as  we  can  see  in  Table  4.5’s  third  line.  In  this  case,  the  annual  natural  rate  of 
economic growth is close to 5.2%, while in bad times it is near to -1%. 
The  tests  indicate  that  the  natural  rate  of  growth  in  Brazil  is  an  endogenous 
variable.  Therefore,  it  can  be  affected  by  the  conditions  of  demand  in  the  Brazilian 
economy. Moreover, we verify that the estimated annual natural rate of economic growth in 
good  times  vary  from  5.2%  to  8%.  Therefore,  the  empirical  results  indicate  that  the 
Brazilian economy performance can be superior to 3.5% without generating inflationary 
pressures. The conclusion is that the recent Brazilian economic growth is not bounded by 
the supply side, but by the demand side. 
    20 
5 – Final Remarks  
  Through out this article we have presented the theory of demand-led growth in order 
to  answer  to  fundamental  questions:  i)  For  what  reason  Brazilian  economy  have 
experienced a growth slowdown in the last two decades relative to the period 1950-1980; ii) 
What kind of economic policy should be adopted in order to restore a robust economic 
growth?  
  Concerning the first question, we rejected the first answer based in the methodology 
on growth accounting, according to which Brazilian economy can only grow at a rate no 
bigger than 3.5% per year in the long-run in the absence of structural reforms in the supply 
side of the economy. 
  Our empirical research had shown the existence of a demand-led growth regime in 
Brazil. In fact, our econometric tests shown that almost 95% of real GDP growth in period 
1990-2005 is explained by variables of the demand-side of the economy. Based on this 
results, we can affirm that growth slowdown in the last decades was due to the end of the 
model  of  aggregate  demand  expansion  adopted  after  1964,  which  was  based  in  the 
expansion  of  consumption  expenditures  in  luxury  goods  driven  by  increasing  income 
concentration in upper and middle classes. The current situation of near-stagnation of the 
Brazilian economy is the result of the inexistence of an alternative model of aggregate 
demand expansion.    
The  econometric  tests  also  shown  that  government  consumption  expenditure 
multiplier is near by 0.37, so that a 1% increase in government consumption expenditure 
will result in an increase in 0.37% of real GDP.  Considering a tax burden of 40% of real 
GDP, we can conclude that a 1% increase in government consumption expenditures will 
increase tax receipts in just 0.15% of GDP. Since Brazil is in a very serious fiscal crisis, 
expressed by the combination of a high tax burden, a high public debt as a ratio to GDP (at 
least  for  emergent  economies)  and  a  very  (almost  inexistent)  government  investment 
expenditures; it is no longer possible to driven economic growth in Brazil by means of an 
expansionary fiscal policy. The only alternative at hand is the adoption of an export-led 
growth model.     21 
  The adoption of this growth model will require the adoption of policies designed to 
increase  the  income  elasticity  of  exports,  increasing  the  long-run  growth  rate  of  the 
Brazilian economy.  
  Finally, we have to stress that, based on the methodology developed by Ledesma 
and Thirwall (2002), we have shown that the natural growth rate of the Brazilian economy 
is endogenous, being a function of actual growth rate. So it seems that there are no limits 
from the supply side of the economy for a robust growth of the Brazilian economy.   
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